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Discrete choice models used in statistical applications typically inter-
pret an unobservable term as the interaction of unobservable horizontal
di¤erentiation and idiosyncratic consumer preferences. An implicit as-
sumption in most such models is that all choices are equally horizontally
di¤erentiated from each other. This assumption is problematic in a num-
ber of recent studies that use discrete choice frameworks to evaluate the
welfare e¤ects from di¤erent numbers of goods (e.g. Berry and Waldfo-
gel, 1999; Rysman, 2000). Researchers might think that it is possible for
product space to “…ll up” and that ignoring this issue might lead to an
overestimate of welfare as the number of new products increases.
This paper proposes a solution whereby the researcher estimates the
decrease in value that agents receive from higher numbers of products as a
result of the decreasing importance of horizontal di¤erentiation. The pa-
per reviews previous results on how a linear random utility model (LRUM)
can be mapped into an address (Hotelling) model. The paper shows
how realistic assumptions on di¤erentiation in an address setting can be
mapped into an LRUM.
LRUM models imply that all choices are strong gross substitutes. In
order to preserve that condition in an address model, n choices must be
di¤erentiated along at least n ¡ 1 dimensions. This paper proposes that
utility drawn from di¤erent dimensions be weighted di¤erently. Mapping
this feature into an LRUM requires weighting the utility from each choice
based upon the dimension along which it is di¤erentiated from others. As
researchers will typically be unwilling to make assumptions about which
dimension products di¤er on, the paper discusses integrating over the
di¤erent possibilities in a computationally inexpensive way that still allows
the researcher to relax the assumption of symmetric di¤erentiation.
¤I would like to thank Dan Ackerberg and Phil Haile for helpful discussion.
11 Introduction
In typical discrete choice models used for statistical applications, two products
with identical observable characteristics split the market. The reasons that
some consumers choose one product and some choose the other is ascribed to
an interaction between unobservable horizontal di¤erentiation and idiosyncratic
consumer tastes. While not often discussed, the features of the discrete choice
model have strong implications for the nature of unobserved horizontal di¤eren-
tiation. For instance, if a third product with identical observable characteristics
also enters, the three products split the market. Therefore, the discrete choice
model implicitly assumes that each product is equivalently di¤erentiated from
each other product. This assumption is problematic in a number of recent stud-
ies. For instance, Rysman (2000) and Berry and Waldfogel (1999) both use
discrete choice frameworks to consider the welfare implications of increasing the
number products in their models. If it is possible for product space to “…ll
up”, then these papers overestimate the welfare gains from higher numbers of
products. In fact, the assumption of equivalent di¤erentiation could be mislead-
ing in any situation in which di¤erent agents face di¤erent numbers of choices.
For instance, Aricidiacono (1999) studies students choosing a college after they
have received acceptances. While students with more choices are surely better
o¤ (controlling for quality), standard discrete choice models may overstate the
amount if students with many choices have colleges which are not very di¤eren-
tiated.
This paper proposes a way to account for these issues in discrete choice
models. The key to doing so is to map the statistical discrete choice model
into a discrete choice model that uses consumer address locations - a Hotelling
model. Most discrete choice models of interest to econometricians are based
around a linear random utility function. There is no intuitive role for horizontal
di¤erentiation in such a model. However, the standard theoretical approach to
2horizontal di¤erentiation is the address model, where horizontal di¤erentiation
is explicit and easy to work with. This paper uses techniques from Anderson,
DePalma and Thisse (1992) (ADT) to link the linear random utility model
(LRUM) to the address model. That is, this paper shows the conditions required
such that both models imply the same market shares and elasticities. Standard
features in the LRUM place important restrictions on the address model in
order to maintain the link. Similarly, this paper develops an address model that
handles horizontal di¤erentiation in a more realistic way. The paper shows how
to take the new features of the address model to the LRUM, allowing researchers
to estimate a discrete choice model without the assumption of equal horizontal
di¤erentiation.
An important feature in random utility models is that all products are strong
gross substitutes, i.e. the shares of all products are sensitive to the mean utility
of each other product. In order to preserve that condition in an address model,
n products must be di¤erentiated along at least n ¡ 1 dimensions. The stan-
dard LRUM suggests that, in the address model, each dimension is weighted
equally in the consumer’s utility function. This paper proposes that di¤erent
dimensions should be allowed to have di¤erent weights. In other words, fea-
tures in the LRUM preclude us from lifting the equal di¤erentiation assumption
by restricting the number of dimensions along which products may di¤erenti-
ate. Instead, we should escape the equal di¤erentation assumption by having
products di¤erentiate into dimensions which consumers care less and less about.
Mapping this feature into an LRUM requires weighting the utility from each
choice based upon the dimension along which it is di¤erentiated from others.
Knowing the actual (unobserved) dimension in the address model is important
because it determines how much utility in the LRUM should be adjusted. As
researchers will typically be unwilling to make assumptions about this kind of
information, which is unobserved by assumption, the paper discusses integrat-
ing over the di¤erent possibilities in a computationally inexpensive way. The
3approach still allows the researcher to estimate the proper adjustment to con-
sumer utility due to lessened horizontal di¤erentiation from higher number of
products.1
The layout of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the linear random
utility model. Section 3 introducestheaddress model and providesthe algorithm
for linking the two models. Section 4 proposes a solution which allows the
researcher to estimate a discrete choice model in which the assumption of equal
di¤erenatiation is lifted in a way that can be easily understood in terms of
the underlying theoretical structure. Section 5 (to be complete) provides an
example of the methodology and Section 6 (to be completed) concludes.
2 The Linear Random Utility Model (LRUM)
ADT characterize a linear random utility model (LRUM) as follows: A unit
mass of agents choose 1 of n choices. Each choice is de…ned by quality level
ui. Each agent receives indirect utility level Vi from a given choice de…ned by
Vi = ui + "i, where "1 :::"n is a random variable drawn from the probability
density f(~ x). So the probability of an agent choosing i is:2













ADT show that an LRUM necessarily implies that choices are weak gross substi-
tutes, i.e. d^ si=duj ￿ 0 i 6= j;rui;uj. But ADT point out that for most speci…c
applications (mulitnomial logit, probit, nested logit), choices are actually strong
gross substitutes, i.e. dsi=duj < 0 i 6= j;rui;uj. I take this condition as an
implication of the LRUM and develop the address model in order to satisfy the
condition.
1The paper is written in terms of consumers choosing products. But obviously, the results
are relevant to any situation in which an agent makes choices.
2Note that Cardell (1997) shows that the Nested Logit model can be characterized in this
way for a particular distribution of ~ ".
43 The Address Model
This section sets up an address model following ADT and shows what assump-
tions can link it to the LRUM (in the sense of matching market shares and
elasticities with respect to ui). The next section suggests intutitive changes to
the address model that solve the problem laid out above, and imposes those
changes onto the LRUM via the technology laid out in this section.
Let there be m characteristics. Each agent is characterized by a vector ~ z
of length m that describes the agent’s ideal choice. Let there be n distinct
products described by a quality level ui and a location ¡ ! z i 2 <m;i = 1;::;n. A
consumer located at ~ z who consumes product i receives utility level:




i )2 i = 1:::n:
The parameter ¿ > 0 measures consumers’ sensitivity to distance. Consumers
choose the option which confers the most utility. The market space of product
i is de…ned to be:
Mi = f~ z 2 <m;Vi(~ z) ¸ Vj(~ z); j = 1:::ng:
Consumers are distributed in <m according to the probability density g(~ z) where




g(~ z)d~ z; i = 1;::: ;n:
Note that
Pn
i=1 si = 1. The paper refers to this model as the address model.
Now consider the conditions on the address model that would allow it to match
the LRUM in terms of market shares and elasticities with respect to ui. In
the LRUM, all choices are strong gross substitutes. ADT prove the following
theorem for the address model:
Theorem 1 For the n variants to be strong gross substitutes, the set f~ z1 :::~ zng
must contain n ¡1 linearly independent points.
5Proof. See ADT, Appendix 4.7.1.
Therefore, we must require that m ¸ n ¡ 1. It is easy to see why products
may not be gross substitutes case in which m = 1 and n = 3. Consider 3
choices with equal quality levels and locations such that z1 < z2 < z3. Then,
@s1=@u3 = 0.
In order to guarantee that the set f~ z1 :::~ zng forms a basis of <m, I make








b if i = j, i = 1:::n ¡ 1;j = 1;::: ;m;
¡b otherwise
zj
n = ¡b j = 1;::: ;m:
The parameter b measures the proximity of choices. Because choices are
di¤erentiated across only their …rst n¡1 characteristics, we can restrict attention
to just those characteristics, and ignore n through m. From now on, I assume
m = n¡1: Now we can characterize market shares and establish the link between
the LRUM and the address model.
The set of consumers who are indi¤erent between i and n is a hyperplane





The set of consumers indi¤erent between i and j is:
f~ z 2 <mj zi ¡ zj = e zj ¡ e zig (2)
Choice n’s market share is Mn = f~ z 2 <m;zj ￿ e zj; j = 1:::mg. Similarly,
choice i’s market share is Mi = f¹ z 2 <m;zi ¸ e ziand zj ￿ e zj + (zi ¡ e zi); j =
1:::[i]:::mg, where the notation [¢] indicates that the enclosed element is
skipped. Now, the de…nition of market share can be rewritten as:
si =
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ADT show that ^ si(u1;::: ;un) = ^ si(u1 ¡ ui;::: ;un ¡ ui). So, we can rewrite
Á(:) as:
Ái(u1 ¡ ui;:::[ui ¡ ui]::: ;un ¡ ui) =
@n¡1^ si(u1 ¡ ui;::: ;un¡1 ¡ui)
@u1 :::[@ui]:::@un
(4)
From Equations 1 and 2, we can substitute un ¡ ui = ¡4b¿e zj and uj ¡ ui =
4b¿(e zj ¡ e zi). Actually, because any agent location ~ z can be reached by some
combination of qualities u1;::: ;un, we can use ~ z instead of b ~ z. By equating
Equation 4 and Equation 3, we can determine the distribution g(~ z) that allows
the address model to match the LRUM. That is, we can compute an equivalent













i)) i = 1:::n:
7For example, write the logit model as:
si =
1
1 + §j=1;j6=i exp[(uj ¡ ui)=¹]
where ¹ > 0 is the standard deviation of "i, usually normalized to 1. Then:








(1 +§j=1;j6=i exp[(uj ¡ui)=¹])
n







¦j=1;j6=i exp[4b¿(zj ¡ zi)=¹]
(1 + §j=1;j6=iexp[4b¿(zj ¡zi)=¹])
n (5)
where zn = 0. As ADT show, the right hand side is equal for all i, which
is obviously necessary in order to have a coherent de…nition of g(~ z). To …x
intuition, consider the n = 3; m = 2 case. Figure 1(a) draws a contour map of
g(~ z) for b = 1; ¿ = 1 and ¹ = 2, assuming products are distributed according to
Assumption 2. This distribution of consumers implies elasticities in the address
model which would match those of the Logit model. Consider a Nested Logit
model, with choices 1 and 2 in a separate nest than 3. Figures 1(b) and 1(c) show
similar contour maps for successively higher degrees of within-nest correlation.
ADT’s system for de…ning the distribution of consumers mimics a Nested Logit
model by putting a greater mass of consumers to the northeast, where they will
prefer 1 and 2 to 3.
The graphs make it clear why Assumption 2 is not restrictive. For a di¤erent
placement of choices in z space, we will just compute a di¤erent distribution of
agents. And the parameters b, ¿, and ¹ have very similar e¤ects. Specifying
choices to be farther apart is equivalent to giving agents greater disutility of
travel, which is equivalent to having a smaller distribution of "i in the LRUM.
84 The Solution
Restrictions on the nature of horizontal di¤erentiation in the address model are
likely to be more intuitive and easier to grasp than attempting to place appro-
priate restrictions directly onto the LRUM. The tight link between the address
model and the LRUM means that it is straightforward to map restrictions from
one to the other. The link also makes it clear what cannot be done. Unequal
di¤erentiation of products cannot be modelled by restricting the number of
dimensions that products expand into. Restricting the number of dimensions
means restricting m < n ¡1. In that case, the address model may imply that
choices are not strong gross substitutes and the link to the LRUM will be lost.
I propose modelling the decreasing value of horizontal di¤erentiation by al-
lowing di¤erent dimensions to have di¤erent travel costs. Instead of restricting
the dimensions by which prodocts can di¤erentiate, have products di¤erenti-
ate into dimensions which agents care less and less about. This change can be
implemented by allowing ¿ to depend on the dimension with which it is inter-
acting. Let ¿(k) measure the disutility to travel in dimension k. Equation 3 can
be rewritten as:




i )2 i = 1:::n:











Now we must map the setup captured in Equation 6 into the LRUM and estimate
¿(k)3. Consider adjusting the standard deviation of "i. In Equation 5, a high
3On the other hand, one could use the original LRUM model. In this case, the algorithm
for …nding g(~ z) would adjust g(~ z) for the fact that, despite the heterogeneous travel costs, the
features of the LRUM were the same. This story amounts to placing the following assumption
on the LRUM model: While products may di¤er in the importance of their di¤erentiation,
consumers are distributed in exactly o¤setting ways. This assumption is no more (or even
9disutility to travel is equivalent to a low variance of "i. So let ¹ = ¹^ ¿(j). Note
that ¹ is not normally identi…ed so ^ ¿(j) can be identi…ed only up to a scalar.
Therefore, there is no loss of generality in assuming ^ ¿(i) = 1 for any given choice
i and estimating ^ ¿(j) j 6= i as product j’s variance relative to i. In this case,
Equation ?? is unchanged. But the Logit model becomes:
^ si =
1
1 +§j=1;j6=i exp[(uj=¹^ ¿(j) ¡ ui=¹^ ¿(i)]
Now it is straightforward to …nd @n¡1si=@u1 :::[@ui]:::@un and create a co-
herent de…nition of g(~ z).
This result shows that it is possible to relax the assumption of equal dif-
ferentiation in a meaningful and structural way. The researcher de…nes some
function ^ ¿(j) where j is the index of the dimension into which product j di¤er-
entiated into. Then the researcher adjusts the vertical utility measure in order
to compensate for the reduced (or increased) importance of that dimension.
A major potential concern is that the researcher must know which dimension
each product has di¤erentiated into. If a choice is assigned position j, then the
utility of that choice is adjusted by ^ ¿ (j). Most researchers would be unwilling
to make assumptions about this “dimension indices”, which are unobservable
by de…nition. A solution is to integrate over all possibilities. If an agent faces n
choices, 1 choice is selected as the “base” choice and there are (n¡2)! possible
sequences of choices. Let I : [1;(n ¡ 2)!] £ [1;n ¡ 1] ! [1;n ¡ 1] be such that










where ^ ¿(n) has been normalized to 1 and un has been normalized to 0. The
…nal fraction weights each possbility equally.
less) palatable than the original assumption that all products are equally di¤erentiated from
each other in terms of both distance and importance.
10The integration approach essentially applies the same adjustment to each
choice, but places a bigger adjustment when there are more choices. This
method gives a clear idea of how ^ ¿ (¢) would be indenti…ed. Consider a Nested
Logit model where the consumers may choose between an outside option and
and 3 or 4 products (all in the nest). The researcher sees that in all markets,
the products split market share equally and so assigns the same vertical utitliy
index to each. But the share to the outside option is about the same across mar-
kets - at least the share to the outside option in the markets with 4 products
is not nearly as decreased as one would expect from estimating on the markets
with only 3 products. The standard Nested Logit model could not capture these
features but allowing markets with 4 goods to have less unobserved horizontal
di¤erentiation gives the researcher an extra degree of freedom with which to
match these stylizied facts.
5 Example
To be completed with my data on Yellow Pages, and possibly other people’s
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